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On October 16, 2023, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Examinations released its 2024 examination priorities to inform investors and registrants of the key risks, examination topics, and priorities that the Division plans to focus on in the upcoming year. This year’s examinations will prioritize areas that pose emerging risks to investors or the markets in addition to core and perennial risk areas.

“The Division of Examinations plays a critical role in protecting investors and facilitating capital formation,” said SEC Chair Gary Gensler. “In examining for compliance with our time-tested rules, the Division helps registrants understand the rules as well as ensures that markets work for investors and issuers alike. The Division’s efforts, as laid out in the 2024 priorities, enhance trust in our ever-evolving markets.”

“Continuing to make our examination priorities public increases transparency into the examination program and encourages firms to focus their compliance and surveillance efforts on areas of potentially heightened risk to retail investors,” said Division of Examinations’ Director Richard R. Best. “We hope that aligning the publication of our examination priorities with the beginning of the SEC’s fiscal year will provide earlier insight to registrants, investors, and the marketplace of adjustments in our areas of focus year to year.”

FINRA recently published an AWC entered into with Richard L. Langer, a registered representative with Planner Securities LLC.  FINRA accused Langer of violating FINRA Rules 2210 and 2220.  FINRA Rule 2210 governs communications by registered representatives with the public and FINRA Rule 2220 sets forth requirements with respect to options-related communications.

The review of Langer’s communications originated with a cycle examination conducted by FINRA Member Supervision.  According to FINRA, between January 2016 and November 2019, Langer maintained a public Facebook page for an investment club he operated. Langer authored 20 posts on the Facebook page regarding the performance, investment returns, industry standing, and purported successes of the investment club and a separate hedge fund at which Langer traded.

For example, on January 9, 2018, Langer posted:

FINRA recently released Regulatory Notice 22-23 providing guidance on what firms should consider when constructing succession plans for Financial Advisors (“FAs”) who will no longer service their customers do to expected or unexpected life events.

The Need for a Plan

The Notice begins by listing the various cost/benefits of having or not having a succession plan, which would seem obvious to all.  It takes no great imagination to see the benefits of a sound succession plan in the event of an FA’s sudden death or the consequent difficulties of not having such a plan.  The Notice, however, provides some interesting real-life anecdotes that FINRA Staff have witnessed of the years regarding succession failures and successes.


It has been reported that Morgan Stanley conducted a “nationwide probe” of abuses associated with its Former Advisor Program, a sun-setting plan that allows retired FAs to receive a split of fees and commissions paid by former clients.  Further to this reporting, we conducted a survey of FINRA AWCs issued in the last 12 months in which FINRA claims an FA falsely used his individual rep code on customer trades in circumvention of the appropriate joint rep code, which would have yielded lesser compensation to the FA.  The results of this survey were interesting.  First, in virtually all cases, the FA worked for Morgan Stanley.  That is interesting.  It seems doubtful that people predisposed to rig the comp system work only for Morgan Stanley.  Second, substantial disparities exist with regard to the sanction imposed by FINRA.  Although the conduct is similar in all cases, FINRA’s sanction has ranged from a wrist-slap (10-business day suspension) to potentially career-ending (six-month suspension).


The table below illustrates the point (with hyperlinks to the AWCs):


Case No. FA Employing Broker-Dealer Sanction
2021071531701 Robert Barberis Morgan Stanley ·         One-month suspension

·         $2,500 fine

2021069218401 Michael Witt Morgan Stanley ·         One-month suspension

·         $5,000 fine

2021071562601 Jeffrey Martin Morgan Stanley ·         15-business day suspension

·         $2,500 fine

2018058614301 Richard Brendza Morgan Stanley ·         Six-month suspension

·         $5,000 fine

2020068897201 Steven Romjue Morgan Stanley ·         Six-month suspension

·         $5,000 fine

2021071847701 William Beasley Morgan Stanley ·         One-month suspension

·         $2,500 fine

2021072169601 Michael Campopiano Morgan Stanley ·         One-month suspension

·         $2,500 fine

2020068936501 Jazmin Carpenter Morgan Stanley ·         10-business day suspension

·         $2,500 fine

2019061720801 Jason Stannard Morgan Stanley ·         10-business day suspension

·         $2,500 fine

2021071276801 Thomas Foster Morgan Stanley ·         One-month suspension

·         $2,500 fine

2021070570201 Michael Dmytryshyn Morgan Stanley ·         10-business day suspension

·         $2,500 fine

2020068810301 John Miller Morgan Stanley ·         15-business day suspension

·         $2,500 fine

2019063245601 Robert Norris Cambridge Investment Research ·         Two-month suspension

·         $5,000 fine


This trend is troubling.  According to a study by J.D. Power, the average age of a financial advisor is 57 years old and approximately one-fifth are 65 or older.  It was estimated by Cerulli Associates that 37% of financial advisors (collectively controlling 40% of total industry assets) will retire within the next 10 years.

All of the major broker-dealers offer sunset plans for retiring FAs.  Merrill Lynch offers the “Client Transition Program.”  UBS offers the “Aspiring Legacy Financial Advisor Core Program.”  Morgan Stanley offers the “Former Advisor Program.”  Wells Fargo offers the “Summit Program.”  Given the age of the workforce, and the proliferation of sunset plans, I’m wondering this:  who is protecting the retiring or retired FA?  Is FINRA proactively protecting against abuses by the inheriting FA or are they simply waiting for Form U5s to drop?  Have firms other than Morgan Stanley audited their sunset plans to ensure that production credits are properly allocated to the retired FA?

The cynic in me believes nothing is being done to protect the interests of participants in the various sunset plans.

Herskovits PLLC represents financial advisors nationwide.  Feel free to call us at (212) 897-5410 to discuss your case.

FINRA’s Office of Hearing Officers recently rendered a decision on an issue of first impression in Dep’t of Enforcement v. NYPPEX, LLC, et al., (Disc. Proc. No. 2019064813801).  Enforcement charged FINRA member firm, NYPPEX, LLC, its former CEO, Laurence Allen, and its CCO, Michael Schunk, with numerous violations of FINRA rules. The charges stemmed from Respondents’ conduct in the wake of a temporary restraining order issued by a New York state court against Allen.  Among other things, the order, obtained at the behest of the Office of the Attorney General for the State of New York (“NYAG”), enjoined Allen from engaging in securities fraud and violating New York’s securities laws. Enforcement took the position that the TRO rendered Allen statutorily disqualified from continued association with a FINRA member firm.  Allen could have remained associated with the Firm if it applied for, and received, FINRA’s permission pursuant to FINRA Rule 9520.  Allen’s supervisor, Schunk, however, purportedly let Allen continue as an associated person at NYPPEX for over a year without seeking a waiver from FINRA.

FINRA’s disciplinary proceeding was triggered by the ex parte TRO.  After a two-year investigation, in December 2018, the NYAG commenced an action under Article 23-A of New York’s General Business Law, known as the Martin Act, against Allen and certain others.  The NYAG applied on an ex parte basis for preliminary injunctive relief against Allen, NYPPEX Holdings, and others under Section 354 of New York’s General Business Law.  The NYAG stated that a preliminary injunction was warranted because of the allegations of fraud and fraudulent practices by Allen and his refusal to produce documents or appear for testimony.  In December 2018, the Supreme Court of the State of New York granted the NYAG the relief it sought and issued the TRO without hearing from Allen or NYPPEX.  Allan was served with the Order in January 2019 and Schunk learned about it that month as well.

On December 4, 2019, the NYAG filed a complaint in the New York Supreme Court against NYPPEX, Allen and others (Index No. 452378/2019).  In February 2020, the New York Supreme Court concluded a five-day hearing and issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting Allen and NYPPEX from, among other things, violating the Martin Act and from “facilitating, allowing or participating in the purchase, sale or transfer of any limited partnership interest in [the fund].”  At this point in time, NYPPEX filed an MC-400 Application seeking permission for NYPPEX to remain associated with a disqualified person, Allen.  FINRA Enforcement, however, argued that Allen became statutorily disqualified when the TRO was issued in 2018, more than a year before NYPPEX filed the MC-400 Application.

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On September 19, 2022, the SEC’s Division of Examination issued a Risk Alert concerning the new investment adviser marketing rule, Advisors Act Rule 206(4)-1 (“the Marketing Rule”).   In connection with the Marketing Rule, the Commission also amended the Books and Records Rule, Advisors Act Rule 204-2 and the Form ADV.  The Marketing Rule became effective on May 4, 2021 but firms were given an 18-month transition period.  Thus, firms must be compliant with the Marketing Rule by November 4, 2022.

According to the Staff’s announcement, examinations will focus on four areas: a) Policies and Procedures, b) the Substantiation Requirement, c) Performance Advertising Requirements, and d) Books and Records

With regard to policies and procedures, the Commission’s noted that the Marketing Rule Adopting Release, stated that firms must adopt procedures that, “include objective and testable means” of preventing violations of the Marketing Rule.  Examples of such means are:

2,773 Spac Images, Stock Photos & Vectors | Shutterstock
On September 6, 2022, the SEC issued an order instituting administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Perceptive Advisors LLC (“Perceptive”) a New York based investment adviser.  In anticipation of the institution of the proceedings, Perceptive and the SEC entered into a Settlement.

Perceptive provides investment advisory advice to pooled investment vehicles and according to its March 31, 2022 Form ADV it had approximately $10.36 billion in assets under management.  One of Perceptive’s investment vehicles is the Perceptive Life Sciences Master Fund, Ltd. (the “PSLM Fund”).

The gravamen of the SEC’s order revolves around Perceptive’s activities concerning special purpose acquisitive companies (“SPACs”).  A SPAC is generally a publicly-traded, shell company which raises money, through an IPO, for the purpose of acquiring other, privately held companies.  SPAC’s have “sponsors” that launch the IPO and generally manage the business of the SPAC, including the process of acquiring target companies.  The sponsor is typically compensated on a percentage (often 20% to 25%) of the SPAC’s initial public offering proceeds (in the form of discounted shares and, at times, warrants).  This compensation is sometimes referred to as the sponsor’s “promote” or “founder shares,” and it is received upon completion of a SPAC’s acquisition of a target company.

On August 23, 2022, FINRA published an AWC reflecting a settlement with ViewTrade Securities, Inc.  The AWC alleges that ViewTrade failed to establish and implement written AML policies and procedures that could reasonably detect and cause the reporting of suspicious transactions in violation of FINRA Rule 3310.  FINRA Rule 3310 requires that each member firm develop and implement a written AML program reasonably designed to achieve and monitor the member’s compliance with the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act (31 U.S.C. 5311, et seq.) (BSA).  Rule 3310(a) further requires firms to, “[e]stablish and implement policies and procedures that can be reasonably expected to detect and cause the reporting of transactions required under [the BSA]  . . . . ”  The regulations implementing the BSA, in turn, require every broker-dealer to file a Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”) with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network any time they detect, “any suspicious transactions relevant to a possible violation of law or regulation.”

FINRA’s past guidance on this issue (NTM 02-21 and Regulatory Notice 19-18) advised firms to look for red flags and provided several examples:

  • Customers’ mailing address is associated with multiple other accounts or business that do not appear related,

FINRA recently released Regulatory Notice 22-18, reminding firms about their obligation to supervise registered representatives to prevent falsification of digital signatures.  FINRA’s guidance comes on the heels of multiple investigations concerning instances when registered representatives forged or falsified client signatures on account transfer documentation or on disclosure forms, “acknowledging a products alignment with the customer’s investment objective and risk tolerance . . . .”

FINRA’s notice explains the varied methods used to forge or falsify electronic signatures and how firms can thwart such forgeries or detect them after the fact.  Generally, electronic signatures have an audit trail with identifying information such as the recipient’s IP address and e-mail address.  Financial advisors have been admonished for sending documents to their personal e-mail addresses or to an assistant to sign the documents themselves.  Firms also found instances where documents were sent to an IP address that was the same as the registered representative or that was inconsistent with the customer address on file.  Sometimes representatives sent e-mails to the e-mail address associated with an outside business activity.  FINRA’s guidance recommends that firms review correspondence to look for these red flags.

FINRA reports that, in some cases, administrative staff raised issues to management about pressure by representatives to manipulate the digital signature process.  FINRA encourages training for such staff to encourage them to resists such pressure.

What is a securities dealer?  The answer is more complicated than people might think.  On August 2, 2022, the SEC announced that it had reached a settlement with a Long Island firm, Crown Bridge Partners, LLC (“Crown Bridge”) and the two brothers who owned the firm Soheil and Sepas Ahdoot, for failing to register as a dealer.  As part of the settlement, the Defendants agree to pay disgorgement and prejudgment interest of $8,390,601.27 and a civil penalty of $810,307, and to a five-year penny stock bar.

According to the SEC’s complaint, Crown Bridge purchased approximately 250 convertible notes from approximately 150 penny stock issuers.  In all, during the Relevant Period, Crown Bridge sold into the public markets approximately 35 billion shares of unrestricted, post-conversion shares of penny stock issuers, for millions of dollars in profits.  Soheil and Sepas initially found companies interested in issuing convertible notes by reviewing OTCMarkets.com, a website that includes a news feed of SEC filings and press releases from penny stock issuers.  They used the website to identify issuers that appeared to need or had expressed a need for financing. They then cold called the issuers directly.  Over time, as Crown Bridge grew its business and became known in the industry, issuers, brokers, and finders reached out directly to Soheil and Sepas to seek funding.

Absent their apparent failure to register Crown Bridge as a Dealer under Exchange Act Section 15(a) [15 U.S.C.§ 78o(a)], Soheil and Sepas executed what appears to have been a very shrewd and successful business plan.  Crown Bridge purchased convertible notes directly from penny stock issuers.  They negotiated the terms of the notes that led to millions of dollars in profits when the notes were converted into shares of stock.  The notes typically contained terms that were highly favorable to Crown Bridge and reduced Crown Bridge’s exposure to market risk such as a conversion discount ranging from 25% to 50% to the prevailing “market price,” a term the notes typically defined as the lowest trading price, or lowest closing bid price, of the issuer’s common stock during the 10 to 25 days on or before the date of the conversion notice.  Also critical was Crown Bridge’s right to convert the notes in increments, enabling Crown Bridge to convert what it could sell immediately, while shielding the remaining balance from exposure to market price movements.

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